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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20040727-SC

GORDON R. KING,
Defendant/Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

ARGUMENT
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief
in reply to the new matters raised in respondent's brief.
A.

THE ADEQUACY OF VOIR DIRE TURNS ON WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
AFFORDED COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT RELEVANT
INFORMATION.

Even though defense counsel told the trial court that the juror questioning was
sufficient and passed jurors 2F and 181 for cause, defendant argues that the court of appeals
correctly applied an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's failure to further question
the two jurors or remove them. See Resp. Brf. at 8-14.l According to defendant, the trial
court cannot rely on the representations of counsel regarding voir dire because "the burden to

On direct appeal, defendant acknowledged that because the jurors were not
challenged at trial below, he was required to show plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel. Aplt. Brf. at 1.

conduct careful voir dire [falls] squarely on the shoulders of the trial courts." Aplt. Brf. at 9,
16. In a nutshell, defendant claims that an abuse of discretion standard is appropriate
because the burden of conducting a careful voir dire is the exclusive responsibility of the trial
court. This claim lacks merit.
It is true that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see that the constitutional rights of an
accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded." State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318,319 (Utah 1977).
It is likewise true that "[v]oir dire questioning is essential to choosing [that] impartial jury
...." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,^33,992 P.2d 951. However, the responsibility for the
content and scope of the voir dire examination rests primarily with trial counsel. It is
counsel who is in the best position to know which biases to explore because "only counsel
will, at the beginning, have a clear overview of the entire case and the type of evidence likely
to be adduced." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988). Thus, under Utah law,
the trial court "may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the [voir dire] examination of
the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination." Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b). But
if the court conducts the examination, it must give counsel an opportunity to ask or submit
questions. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(b).
The trial court "ha[s] some discretion in limiting voir dire inquiry." Saunders, 1999
UT 59, f 43. But this Court has held that "that discretion must be 'liberally exercised' in
favor of allowing counsel to elicit necessary information for ferreting out bias, whether for a
for-cause or a peremptory challenge." Id. at Tf 34 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In
doing so, the trial court helps safeguard an accused's right to an impartial jury. See Dixon,

2

560 P.2d at 319. Accordingly, this Court has consistently defined the trial judge's voir dire
obligation in terms of what questioning the trial court "allows" counsel to present.
In support of his claim that the trial court's voir dire was inadequate, defendant cites
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988), State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889
P.2d 393 (Utah 1994),2 and State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991).. See Resp. Brf.
at 9-10,16. But these cases do not support that proposition. To the contrary, they hold that a
trial court's voir dire examination will be insufficient only if the trial court does not "allow[ ]
counsel to elicit [relevant] information from prospective jurors." Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845.
In Ball, the Court explained that "a party must be allowed to gather sufficient relevant
information during voir dire" so he or she can make informed decisions when challenging
prospective jurors. 685 P.2d at 1060 (emphasis added). The Court "h[e]ld that the failure of
the [trial] court to permit counsel's inquiry was . . . error . . . . " Id.
In Bishop, the Court held that "whether the trial court abused its discretion in
conducting voir dire turns on whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel
was afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors."
753 P.2d at 448 (emphases added). The Court rejected Bishop's claims of inadequate voir
dire because he had "not . . . established] that the court's interruptions and questioning

Menzies overruled the automatic reversal rule applied in Bishop, which required
reversal whenever a party was compelled to exercise a peremptory challenge on a
prospective juror who should have been removed for cause, but was not. 889 P.2d at 397-98.
3

[during counsel's questioning of the prospective jurors] deprived him of the opportunity to
discover information relevant to [the juror's] fitness for jury service." Id. (emphasis added).
In Worthen, the Court explained that "[although a trial judge has some discretion in
limiting voir dire examinations, that discretion should be liberally exercised in favor of
allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors." 765 P. 2d at 845 (emphasis
added). Continuing, the Court held that "the fairness of a trial may depend on the right of
counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious
and subconscious,...." Id. (emphasis added). The Court ultimately rejected Worthen's
claim because "[t]he record simply [did] not demonstrate that the trial judge prevented
counsel from exploring certain topics." Id.
In James, the Court reiterated that the trial court's discretion to limit voir dire
"'should be liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from
prospective jurors.'" 819 P.2d at 798 (quoting Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845) (emphasis added).
The Court explained that "trial courts can and should conduct voir dire proceedings in a way
which not only meets constitutional requirements, but also enables litigants and their
counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and which attempts, as much as
possible, to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
Other cases have likewise so held. As noted, this Court in Saunders held that
"effective voir dire questioning of prospective jurors must not be prevented

" 1999 UT

59, \ 34. The Court explained that a judge's discretion is broad when counsel's proposed
questions "have no apparent link to any potential bias," but "narrows" when the proposed

4

questions "have some possible link to possible bias." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 43. And
"when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an actual bias, that
discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such inquiries." Id. And in State v. Wach,
2001 UT 35, f 42,24 P.3d 948, the Court rejected a claim that possibly biased jurors should
have been excused for cause because the defendant "failed to demonstrate that he was not
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate [the] jurors
.. .." (emphasis added).
Defendant here has not alleged that he was prevented from eliciting more information
from jurors 2F and 181. See Resp. Brf. Nor could he. After juror 8H was called for
additional questioning, the trial judge said, "I think we have probably talked to everyone else
who raised their hand." R. 109:50. Defense counsel agreed, replying, "I think so." R. 109:
50. Then, after questioning juror 8H, the judged asked, "[D]o both sides pass the jury for
cause with those strikes noted?" R. 109: 53. Counsel responded, "Yes, your Honor." R.
109: 53. Not once did counsel ask that jurors 2F and 181 be questioned further.
Therefore, as in Worthen, "[t]he difficulty in this case is that the defendant has not
demonstrated that he was prevented from asking proper questions." Worthen, 765 P.2d at
839. Despite given the opportunity to do so, he declined. "The record simply does not
demonstrate that the trial judge prevented counsel from exploring certain topics," i.e., the
details of the two jurors' first- or second-hand experience with abuse. Where the trial court
did not limit the voir dire examination, there can be no claim that it abused its discretion.
Therefore, its failure to ask additional questions can only be reviewed for plain error. See
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State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,fflf7-8, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333-34
(Utah 1993); see also Pet. Brf. at 10-15.
B.

THE JURORS' ASSURANCES THAT THEY COULD B E
SUFFICIENT TO REBUT ANY INFERENCE OF BIAS.

FAIR WERE

Defendant argues that jurors 2F and 181 were "presumptively biased" and that the
inference of bias was not rebutted. See Resp. Brf. at 13-14. He claims that the jurors'
assurances that they could be impartial notwithstanding their first- or second-hand
experience with abuse were insufficient to rebut the inference. Resp. Brf. at 13. However,
defendant cites no authority in support of this claim. An examination of the relevant case
law reveals that any inference of bias was sufficiently rebutted by their assurance of
impartiality.
It is true that when a potentially biased juror is challenged for cause, the juror's
statement alone that she can be fair and impartial is usually insufficient to rebut the inference
of bias. See Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536. However, when the juror's assurance is not
challenged by counsel, the trial court can properly rely on that assurance. In Saunders, this
Court explained:
[A] juror's statement alone that he or she can decide a case fairly pursuant to
the law given by the trial court is not a sufficient basis for qualifying a juror
when [1] the prospective juror's answers provide evidence of possible bias and
[2] the trial court does not allow further questions designed to probe the extent
and depth of the bias.
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 36 (emphasis added). When both conditions are present, the
assurance is not satisfactory. However, when only one condition is present, the assurance is
sufficient. As discussed, the trial court below did not prevent counsel from asking further
6

questions. Counsel agreed that all those who needed to be questioned had been questioned
and passed the two jurors for cause. Because the trial court allowed further questioning, the
jurors' assurances were sufficient to rebut any inference of bias.
C.

T H E REMOVE-OR-REHABILITATE RULE APPLIES ONLY
CHALLENGE IS MADE TO A POTENTIALLY BIASED JUROR,

WHEN

A

Defendant also relies on State v. Wooley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 826
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that a trial court abuses its discretion if it does not
remove a potentially biased juror or rehabilitate the juror through further inquiry. Resp. Brf.
at 11. Wooley, in turn, relied on this Court's decision in State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah
1989). In Cobb, the Court articulated a "remove-or-rehabilitate" rule: "When comments are
made which facially question a prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion may occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court
or counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted." Id. at 1126.
As explained in the State's opening brief, this abuse of discretion standard applies
only where the juror is "challenged" by counsel. See Pet. Brf. at 10-15. Otherwise, the
Court will review the claim on appeal only upon a showing of plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel. Cobb is a case on point.
On appeal, Cobb claimed that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss two prospective
jurors for cause: Joyce Lloyd, because of her prior acquaintance with the prosecuting
attorney, and Jesse Holden, because he stated during voir dire that "he had 'very, very strong
feelings about the taking of human life.'" Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1125-26. This Court examined
the voir dire inquiry of Ms. Lloyd under the remove-or-rehabilitate rule and concluded that
7

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss her. Id. at 1226. However,
the Court held that it was precluded from reviewing Cobb's claim that Mr. Holden was
biased because of his strong feelings about the taking of human life. The Court observed
that "defendant did not raise this claim [of bias] below," but challenged Mr. Holden on other
grounds. Id. After observing that "the grounds for an objection must be specifically and
distinctly stated," the Court held that "[fjailure to meet these requirements precludes review
of defendant's claim [of juror bias] on appeal." Id.
Under Cobb, therefore, this Court will not review for an abuse of discretion a trial
court's failure to remove or rehabilitate a potentially biased juror if 1 here is no specific
challenge to that juror. In that case, a claim of juror bias raised for the first time on appeal
can be made only upon a showing of plain error. See Litherland,, 2000 UT 76, ^ 7-8;
Olsen, 860 P.2d at 333-34.
D.

SOUND POLICY SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE REMOVE-ORREHABILITATE RULE ONLY W H E N A POTENTIALLY BIASED JUROR I S
CHALLENGED DURING VOIR DIRE AND THE SHOWING OF ACTUAL BIAS
W H E N N O CHALLENGE IS MADE TO THE JUROR.

Sound policy supports application of the remove-or-rehabilitate rule only when a
potentially biased juror is challenged during the voir dire examination. During jury
selection, "it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the
prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,536 (Utah 1981).

3

The Court then "considered] arguendo" the merits of Cobb's claim that Mr. Holden
was biased under the remove-or-rehabilitate" rule and concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss him for cause. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126-28.
8

ADMITTEDLY BIASED JURORS
Could not be fair because of her
experience as a former DCFS
worker

Could not be fair because she
and a family member had been
victims of abuse

/

Juror

\

I

Juror

\

Could not be fair because her
son had been the victim of
sexual abuse

Could not be fair because she
had some experience with sexual
abuse

PROFESSED IMPARTIAL JURORS

Could be fair even though she
had some experience with abuse
Subject to Wooley's
Remove-or-Rehabilitate
Requirement

Could be fair even though she
had some experience with abuse

Could be fair even though he
had some experience with abuse

-Defense Did Not Request Additional Questioning
Could be fair even though had
some experience with abuse

Removed for Cause
Passed for Cause

/

Juror

\

I

Juror

\

Could be fair even though had
some experience with abuse

Accordingly, this Court has emphasized that "trial judges should err on the side of caution in
ruling on for-cause challenges and that the scope ofjudicial discretion accorded a trial judge
must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the
simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open
to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 51.
On the other hand, when a timely challenge to a potentially biased juror is not made
and the juror is passed for cause, it is no longer "a simple matter to obviate any problem of
bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another." Jenkins, 627 P.2d at
536 (Utah 1981). The jury has been selected, the remaining venire panel has been excused,
and the possibly biased juror can no longer be replaced. And when the claim ofjuror bias is
first raised on appeal, the evidence has been presented, the jury has rendered a verdict of
guilty, and the defendant has been sentenced. Under these circumstances, it would not be
sound policy to require a new trial based on the "possibility" a juror was biased.
Indeed, our courts have almost universally required a showing of actual bias before
disturbing a jury verdict based on possible juror bias. The United States Supreme Court has
concluded that "due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in
a potentially compromising position." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940,
946 (1982). With perhaps a few exceptions, infra, a new trial is appropriate only upon a
showing of actual bias. Id. at 215-17, 102 S.Ct. at 945-446. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court "has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which
the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias." Id. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 945.
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As discussed, requiring the removal of a potentially biased juror during the jury
selection process is sound policy because any concern of bias "can be dispensed by the
simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open
to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 51. And as discussed, such is not the case with a
prospective juror who survived the selection process, passed for cause, and served on the
jury. In that case, this Court has held that defendant must establish actual bias. See Menzies,
889 P.2d at 398 (holding that "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove
a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the
jury was partial or incompetent"). The court of appeals below acknowledged that such a
showing has not been made. See State v. King, 2004 UT App 210, K 18, 95 P.3d 282.
But citing State v. Pike, 712P.2d277 (Utah 1985), defendant argues that a conviction
may be reversed "solely because it appears that the right to an impartial jury has been
jeopardized." Resp. Brf. at 11. Pike is inapposite.
In Pike, the arresting officer, who was also a witness at the scene of the altercation,
spoke to three jurors during a trial recess about an injury he suffered at home. Pike, 712 P.2d
at 279-80. When the trial court learned of the conversation, it questioned the officer about
the encounter. Id. "The judge and counsel agreed to let the incident go until after the verdict
was in and then to question the jurors involved in the conversation." Id. at 279 After the
trial, the court questioned the jurors and determined that the conversation was innocuous. Id.
The trial court denied Pike's subsequent motion for a new trial. Id.
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In reversing, this Court observed that "[a]nything more than the most incidental
contact during the trial between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the
jury and at best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." Id. at 279-80. The
Court determined that "the conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact,"
that it "no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the
jurors judgment as to credibility," and that as such, it created a presumption of bias. Id. at
281. The Court concluded that any denial by the jurors that they were influenced by the
encounter would not be sufficient to rebut the presumption of bias. Id. The Court so
concluded because the contact created "the appearance of impropriety" and actual prejudice
was "not provable." Id. at 280.
This case is unlike Pike. First, there is no "appearance of impropriety" on the part of
the prosecution, as in Pike. And second, unlike jurors who have more than incidental contact
with a key prosecution witness, impartiality can be established for jurors who have some
unknown first- or second-hand experience with sexual abuse. This case proves the point.
Like jurors 2F and 181, jurors 8H, 20 J, and 28K had some ambiguous experience with
sexual abuse.

All three assured the court that they could be fair and impartial

notwithstanding that experience. Further questioning revealed the extent of that experience
and provided a basis for assessing the jurors' ability to judge impartially. Juror 8H's wife
had been sexually abused as a child before he met her. R. 109: 51-53. Juror 20J had been
the victim of sexual abuse as a teenager and her niece had been sexually abused four years
earlier. R. 109: 35-38. Juror 28K's uncle had been accused of sexually abusing juror 28K's
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seven-year-old cousin. R. 109: 42-44. The inference of bias in jurors 8H and 28K was
rebutted and both passed for cause. See R. 109: 44, 53. It was not rebutted with respect to
juror 20J and she was dismissed for cause. R. 109: 45.
In sum, the trial court's questioning of the three jurors enabled it to assess their ability
to set aside their experiences and judge defendant impartially. Likewise, the ability ofjurors
2F and 181 could be assessed in a post-trial hearing through questions similar to those
presented to jurors 8H, 20J, and 28K. Defendant contends that such a hearing would violate
rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Resp. Brf. at 14. That rule, however, only prohibits a
juror from testifying "as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror's mental processes in connection therewith ...." Utah R. Evid. 606(b).
No such an inquiry need be made. Questioning that revealed the nature and scope of the
jurors' experience, as presented to jurors 8H, 20J, and 28K, would be sufficient and would
not violate rule 606(b).4
Moreover, a rule that does not require a showing of actual bias would constitute a
departure from this Court's approach in cases where a juror did not honestly answer a
question in voir dire. This Court has adopted the two-part test articulated in McDonough
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548,104 S.Ct. 845 (1984), for determining
whether a new trial is warranted where a juror failed to answer questions honestly during

4

See Addendum A (Graphic Summarizing Voir Dire)
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voir dire. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (Utah 1992). Under that test, the defendant is
entitled to a new trial "if the moving party demonstrates that (1) 'a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire/ and (2) 'a correct response would have provided a
valid basis for a challenge for cause."5 Id. at 245 (quotingMcDonough, 464 U.S. at 556,104
S.Ct. at 850).
To determine whether the McDonough two-prong test has been met, this Court
requires an evidentiary hearing by the trial court. See Thomas, 111 P.2d at 451 (remanding
to trial court for evidentiary hearing); State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f, 20 P.3d 888 (trial court
holding evidentiary hearing on McDonough claim). In Thomas one juror failed to disclose
that she had been the victim of a sexual assault and another juror failed to disclose that her
child had been sexually abused. Thomas, 111 P.2d at 450. In Evans, a juror failed to
disclose that her uncle was the chief deputy in the prosecutor's office. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^f
24. In both cases, disclosure during voir dire would have likely triggered the remove-orrehabilitate rule. Nevertheless, neither disclosure was sufficient to require a new trial under
McDonough. Defendants must establish actual bias. See Evans, 2001 UT 22, \ 28 (finding
juror impartial after reviewing testimony regarding extent of relationship).
* * *

In sum, the policy considerations for requiring removal or rehabilitation of a
potentially biased juror that is challenged during voir dire do not apply to such a juror who is
expressly passed for cause. In the former case, any concern of bias can be easily addressed
by removing the juror and replacing him or her with a juror whose impartiality is not in
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doubt. In the latter case, such a remedy is not available. As a general rule, this Court
requires a showing of actual bias on a claim ofjuror bias. This case should be no different.
An evidentiary hearing would reveal whether the two jurors' experiences were such as to
create "light impressions" or impressions which are "strong and deep" and which will affect
the jurors' impartiality. Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1126-27. Such a requirement is consistent with
this Court's jurisprudence under the McDonough test.
E.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PLAIN ERROR OR INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Defendant contends that even if the court of appeals incorrectly applied the abuse of
discretion standard, this Court should nevertheless affirm under plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel. Resp. Brf. at 14. This argument fails.
1. Plain Error Cannot Be Found Where No Case Law Has Applied the
Remove-or-Rehabilitate Rule to Unpreserved Challenges and Where
Defense Counsel Affirmatively Waived Any Alleged Error.
Defendant contends that the trial court's failure to sua sponte remove the two jurors
was obvious error because, he alleges, the law is well-established that where voir dire reveals
"jurors with experiences relating to crimes similar to those being adjudicated," trial courts
are "require[d]... to remove the jurors for cause or to conduct in-depth voir dire rebutting
their presumptive bias . . . . " Resp. Brf. at 15. This claim fails for two reasons.
First, as discussed above, the remove-or-rehabilitate rule has heretofore only been
applied where there has been a challenge to the juror during voir dire. It has not been applied
in a case, like here, where the jurors are passed for cause. Accordingly, any error could not
be obvious. State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276 (holding that to establish plain
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error, defendant is required to "show that the law governing the error was clear at the time
the alleged error was made"). And second, as discussed in the opening brief, defendant
cannot claim plain error where he affirmatively waived any challenge, or invited the error.
See State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639,642 (Utah 1988); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah
1988) ("hold[ing] that DeMille's failure to voir dire the jurors on [child abuse or biases about
defendant harming a child even though he had opportunity to do so] constitutes a waiver and
bars inquiry into the bias question").
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cannot be Found Where There
Has Been No Showing of Actual Prejudice.
Defendant contends that this Court should, in any event, affirm on the ground that his
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Resp. Brf. at 18-23. To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was
deficient, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). He can establish neither.
Defendant claims that counsel was deficient because he did not challenge the two
jurors for cause. Resp. Brf. at 21-22. However, both jurors assured the court that their
experience with sexual abuse would not affect their ability to be impartial. Counsel was
present during the examination and it should therefore be assumed that based on the jurors'
demeanor, counsel concluded that their responses were genuine. See id at 690,104 S.Ct. at
206 (holding that "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance").
As to part two of the Strickland analysis, defendant acknowledges that his "[c]ounsel
did not know ifjurors [2F] and [ 181] were actual victims of child sexual abuse or relatives or
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friends of victims." Resp. Brf. at 21. Defendant nevertheless argues that the possibility of
juror bias based on their unknown experience with sexual abuse is sufficient to establish
prejudice. Resp. Brf. at 22-23. This argument is incorrect. As with plain error, "[t]o
maintain a[n] [ineffectiveness] claim that a biased juror prejudiced him,... [defendant] must
show that the juror was actually biased against him." Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75
(8th Cir. 1995). As discussed above, defendant has failed to make that showing.
Defendant nevertheless argues that to the extent that the factual details of the jurors'
legal bias are not in the record to further establish prejudice, this is attributable to the trial
court's inadequate voir dire, an independent basis for reversal." Resp. Brf. at 23. This claim
lacks merit. Under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] party to an appeal in a
criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of
fact, necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel." Utah R. App. P. 23B(a). Defendant thus had an opportunity to seek an evidentiary
hearing on the issue, but failed to do so. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim must fail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State respectfully
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
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